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Abstract 
There remains a debate about ‘oil and the macroeconomy’ despite James Hamilton’s claims. 
Manufacturing in 1970s US was, however, reliant on natural gas and electricity generated from coal, 
not oil. Whilst coal and electricity prices also rose in the 1970s their descent to pre-1974 levels was 
slower than the decline in oil prices. This research considers energy resilience during the 1970s. Spare 
capacity, natural gas and renewable energy are key resilience characteristics that predict improved 
manufacturing employment. The conclusion reached is that the rise in coal prices played a role, 
separate to oil price, in the macro-economies of US states. 
1 Introduction 
The period from October 1973 to the end of 1980 was characterised by oil supply volatility 
which led to elevated oil prices of between 2 and 5 times the price for a barrel of West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI) as at September 1973. Elevated prices spread fast to Natural Gas (NG) 
and coal fuel systems, and also electricity systems, as consumers sought substitutes which 
increased demand and, consequently, price for alternative energy sources. An increase in the 
price of oil and NG could have been foreseen due to declining US oil and NG production, but 
the increase in the price of coal was as a result of perceptions that energy, in all forms, would 
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never again be cheap (Fiscor, 2012). Even the fuel systems in the coal producing states 
lacked the spare capacity (Westerstrom, 1973; Westerstrom, 1974) to respond to policy action 
taken by the federal government to enforce the use of coal as a fuel for electricity generation 
(US Government, 1978), resulting in a large increase in the price of coal. 
There is a body of research which has sought to explain the consequences of oil price rises on 
the US economy but there is little evidence of research focused on the consequences of the 
surge in coal and NG prices during that period. The cost of coal was particularly important 
for electricity generation and energy-intensive manufacturing. For this reason, this paper 
seeks to add another perspective to the body of research into the consequences of energy 
price rises on the macroeconomy, by looking in detail at the effect of other energy sources on 
US manufacturing employment during the period of the oil price crises.  
The framework of the research in the paper is guided by the concept of resilience. Whilst 
there is a body of research into resilience and resilience in energy, most of it is directed at the 
application of metrics to indices or frameworks (Gea, 2012; IEA, 2011; Roege et al., 2014; 
Sharifi and Yamagata, 2015; Arghandeh et al., 2016). The inclusion of metrics is based on 
subjective assumptions of importance rather than empirical evidence of their relevance. In 
this regard, the measurement of resilience is similar to the field of energy security, where 
metrics are selected for indices based on subjective decision criteria (Ang et al., 2015). The 
framework employed here is discussed in (Molyneaux et al., 2016a) and applied in 
(Molyneaux et al., 2016b) and provides a model for identifying the resilience metrics which 
show statistical significance in predicting outcomes. The research into the characteristics of 
resilience and electricity generation indicates the significance of spare capacity and diversity 
in energy in predicting lower electricity prices (Molyneaux et al., 2016b), and establishes a 
method for analysing the consequences of a lack of spare capacity and diversity in energy on 
manufacturing employment.  
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The empirical analysis is expanded by a case study of the US Iron and Steel industry (ISI). It 
finds that the ISI, operating at the confluence of shock due to decreased automobile sales and 
increased energy costs, was seriously damaged by a lack of resilience in energy. 
The paper is organised as follows. The resilience framework and the methods used in the 
empirical and qualitative analysis are described in section 2 while section 3 extends the 
discussion to prior research into the relationship between oil and the macroeconomy and how 
this empirical analysis differs from that prior research. Section 4 presents the results of the 
empirical and qualitative analysis, with discussion on the results in section 5. Some 
implications and concluding remarks appear in section 6.  
2 Methods 
2.1 Resilience framework 
The framework employed here is discussed in (Molyneaux et al., 2016a) and applied in 
(Molyneaux et al., 2016b) and identifies the resilience metrics which show statistical 
significance in predicting electricity prices during the 1973-82 oil price crises.  The resilience 
metrics found to be significant in predicting lower electricity prices include spare capacity 
and source of fuel and so these metrics are examined for their ability to predict manufacturing 
employment outcomes in the period from 1973 to 1982. 
2.2 Empirical analysis model  
A multiple linear regression analysis is used to examine, for each state in the US, the 
relationship between proportion of each fuel consumed by industry and spare capacity in 
energy, as explanatory variables, and the change in manufacturing employment as the 
dependent variable. The primary data is drawn from: the US Energy Information Agency 
(EIA) State Energy Database System (SEDS); the EIA’s Form759 for electricity capacity and 
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generation data by year, state and plant; the Bureau of Economic Analysis for manufacturing 
employment data; and the Bureau of Census Annual Survey of Manufactures for detailed Iron 
and Steel industry data. Throughout the analysis, real prices are used to differentiate from 
movements in the general level of prices. 
Calculation of the two explanatory variables is as follows: 
Proportion of energy consumed by industry from each fuel type 
The calculation of quantity of each fuel source consumed in each statei is detailed in Equation 
1.  
 
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖 = ∑ (𝐼𝐶𝐵𝑖 + ( 
𝐸𝐺𝑖
𝑇𝐸𝐺
 𝑥 𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐵) + (
𝐸𝐺𝑖
𝑇𝐸𝐺
 𝑥 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐶𝐵))
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
Equation 1 
 
Where: 
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖 
 
Total energy consumed by industry for fuel type 𝑖 in BBtu 
𝑖 fuel types: Coal (CL), Natural Gas (NG), Petroleum (PA), Nuclear (NU), 
Renewable Energy (RE) 
𝐼𝐶𝐵𝑖 Primary energy consumed by industry for fuel type 𝑖 (excluding electricity) 
in BBtu 
𝐸𝐺𝑖 Electricity generated from fuel  type 𝑖 in TWh  
𝑇𝐸𝐺 Total electricity generated in TWh 
𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐵 Electricity consumed by industry in BBtu  
𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐶𝐵 Industry’s share of electricity system losses in BBtu 
 
Estimating the percentage of each fuel type used in each state is constructed from Equation 1 
and data available in SEDS and takes the form: 
 
𝑝𝑖 =  
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖
𝑇𝐸𝐼𝐶𝐵
 
 
Equation 2 
Where:  
𝑝𝑖 Percentage of energy consumed from fuel type 𝑖 
𝑖 fuel type: CL, NG, NU, PA, RE 
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖 Total energy consumed by industry from fuel type 𝑖 in BBtu 
𝑇𝐸𝐼𝐶𝐵 Total energy consumed by industry in BBtu 
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The total energy consumed from each fuel type for use by industry is calculated for each year 
1973-82 and then averaged across the period 1973-82. 
Spare capacity in the energy system 
Considering the gaps in the available data on productive capacity within each of the fuel 
systemsii, a proxy for spare capacity is constructed using the difference between the value of 
energy produced and the value of energy consumed as a proportion of GDP, and is calculated 
for each state as 
 
𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑃 =  ∑
(𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑉𝑖 − 𝑇𝐸𝑃𝑉𝑖)
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
Equation 3 
Where 
𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑃 
 
Total energy gap as proportion of GDP 
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑉𝑖 Value of energy consumed from fuel type 𝑖 
𝑇𝐸𝑃𝑉𝑖 Value of energy produced from fuel type 𝑖 
iii 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑅 Real Gross Domestic Product (in $2012 millions) 
𝑖 fuel types: CL, NG, PA 
 
The energy gap is calculated for each year 1973-82 and then summed and divided by the total 
real GDP for the period 1973-82. 
The dependent variable is the change in manufacturing employment. The intention is to seek 
to measure the importance of spare capacity and different energy sources as predictors of 
manufacturing employment outcomes during an energy shock. Manufacturing employment 
change over the period 1973-82 is aggregated to reduce the noise of time lags over the period, 
providing a weighted average performance over a decade of energy price shock.  
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2.2.1 Regression model for manufacturing employment prediction from resilience 
metrics 
The ordinary least squares regression modeliv for manufacturing employment change 
prediction takes the form: 
 𝐸𝑀𝑃_𝐶𝐻𝐺𝑠 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑝1𝑠+. . . + 𝛽𝑘𝑝𝑘𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠  
where Equation 4  
𝐸𝑀𝑃_𝐶𝐻𝐺𝑠 Change in manufacturing employment in state s  
𝛽0 EMP_CHG  intercept  
𝛽𝑘 coefficients of  𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑠 and 𝑝𝑘𝑠  
𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑠 Total energy gap as a proportion of GDP in state s  
𝑝𝑘𝑠 Percentage of energy consumed by fuel type 𝑘 in state s  
𝜀𝑠 random error in EMP_CHG  for state s  
 
2.3 Case study 
Through the case study, the model seeks to understand the consequence of increased energy 
costs on manufacturing sector employment and particularly iron and steel industry (ISI) 
employment. It considers the relative size of employment in the sector to total employment 
and the consequences of increased energy costs on profitability, competitiveness and 
employment. A regional perspective is also taken.  
3 Previous research into the relationship between energy and the 
macroeconomy 
A body of research into the 1970s oil crises sought to explain the consequences of oil price 
rises on the US economy. James Hamilton first proposed a relationship between oil prices 
and US recessions after the 1970s oil crises. Analysing a 6-variable macroeconomic system, 
he found that none of the variables could account for the US recessions between 1949 and 
1972, but that rises in the price of oil did precede all but one of the US recessions during this 
period (Hamilton, 1983). Since then, many researchers have produced evidence to support 
Hamilton’s proposal. (Burbidge and Harrison, 1984) found that oil price affected both 
7 
 
inflation and industrial production after the shocks of 1973-4 and 1979-80, although the 
impact of the oil price shocks differed between countries.  (Gisser and Goodwin, 1986) 
concluded that oil prices had a significant impact on a broad range of US macro-economic 
indicators including Gross National Product, inflation and unemployment between 1961 and 
1982. (Daniel, 1997) concluded that the oil price trend explained a significant portion of 
short-run variation in industrial production over the period 1960-92. (Raymond and Rich, 
1997)  highlighted the significant role oil prices played in the business cycle contractions 
during the periods 1973-75, 1980 and 1990-91, but that other factors were more important 
than oil prices during other expansionary and contractionary business cycles over the period 
1951-95. (Mork, 1989) found evidence of a negative relationship between oil price increases 
and macro-economic performance over the period 1949-88, but no evidence of a related 
symmetrical relationship with oil price decreases and macro-economic performance.  
The relationship between oil and the macro-economy remains controversial because the 
correlation between oil prices and the macro-economy weakened after 1985 (Hooker, 1996), 
which some have attributed to the declining energy intensity of the US economy (Blinder, 
2009), lower real wage rigidity (Blanchard and Riggi, 2009) or a large reallocation of capital 
and labour to other sectors after the 1970s oil crises (Hamilton, 1988; Davis and Haltiwanger, 
2001). The latter view is partially supported by (Edelstein and Kilian, 2009) who suggest that 
the lack of macroeconomic response to low oil prices in 1986 was heavily influenced by low 
business investment in equipment and structures, perhaps as a result of the removal of 
investment tax credits which formed part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act.  
Others claim that the role of oil prices in macro-economic performance has been overstated 
with insufficient evidence to support the proposal  (Bohi, 1991). The small fraction that the 
increased cost of oil represents in the larger US economy suggested to some that it was 
impossible that oil price increases could have induced the magnitude of the recessions in 
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1975, 1980 and 1982 (Tobin, 1980; Bohi, 1991). After considering the timing of oil price 
increases and recessions, (Barsky and Kilian, 2004) conclude that oil price shocks may 
contribute to recessions but that they matter less than has commonly been thought. This view 
has been taken up and further adapted for the lack of response of the US economy to oil price 
rises in the period 2003-7. Although (Hamilton, 2009) found evidence that the oil price rises 
had played a part in macroeconomic decline in early 2008. However, (Blinder, 2009) argued 
that all macroeconomic time series declined after the failure of the bank, Lehman Brothers, 
on September 15, 2008 and that the decline in macro-economic performance prior to 
September 2008 may be considered as to not have been a recession thus discounting 
Hamilton’s findings.  
There has also been discussion on the macro-economic effects of uncertainty caused by oil 
price volatility which resulted in pauses in consumer purchases (Bernanke, 1983).  The 
effects of changes in consumer behaviour induced by oil price increases on regional 
economies dependent on manufacturing were noted in several studies (Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1996; Davis et al., 1996; Davis et al., 1997; Lee and Ni, 2002). The automobile 
industry is identified as heavily affected by uncertainty and a decline in demand after an oil 
price increase (Lee and Ni, 2002; Davis et al., 1997; Hamilton, 1988; Hamilton, 2009; 
Edelstein and Kilian, 2009)  but also structurally ill-prepared for the shifts required to 
respond to very large increases in oil prices (Bresnahan and Ramey, 1993). Others have 
found that the reduction in consumer purchases of durables like automobiles could be 
ascribed to increased energy expenditures, but that total factor productivity remains the major 
driver of the poor economic performance after oil price increases (Kim and Loungani, 1992; 
Dhawan and Jeske, 2008). (Edelstein and Kilian, 2009) found that without consumer 
spending declines, oil price increases have a small effect on macroeconomic performance.  
They also hypothesise that the relative size of the automobile industry with respect to the US 
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economy has declined since the 1970s, which partly explains why the increase in oil prices 
since 2003 and the resulting decline of motor vehicle sales have not resulted in the 
macroeconomic decline experienced in the 1970s and early 1980s.  
Monetary policy has been identified by some as a better predictor of US macro-economic 
performance than oil price rises (Bohi and Powers, 1993; Bernanke et al., 1997). Response to 
Bernanke et al.’s research however highlights that uncertainty remains about the extent of the 
real effects of monetary policy on macro-economic performance (Sims, 1997). Using the 
same data and model but with a longer lag length, (Hamilton and Herrera, 2004) conclude 
that monetary policy was not a better predictor of US macro-economic performance than oil 
price rises.  
The debate around the significance of oil price movements for macroeconomic performance 
remains unresolved and is ongoing. What is notable about the debate is that the focus has 
been on establishing a relationship between economic performance and some version of the 
oil price. Only since the arrival of significant production of unconventional natural gas has 
some discussion emerged of the impact of non-oil prices on manufacturing. Most of this 
research points to modest increases in manufacturing output, investment and employment as 
a result of declining NG prices (Celasun et al., 2014; Sendich, 2014), but potentially 
significant increases for NG-intensive industries (Melick, 2014). 
Oil price rises may have been a catalyst for price rises in NG, coal and electricity in 1974, but 
the price trajectories of those energy sources over the 1970s and 1980s was not in lock-step 
with oil prices. In addition, while oil was the major source of energy for the transport sector, 
it was not for industry.  Figure 1 shows that NG was a greater contributor to industry in 
California (CA) and Texas (TX) than was oil. For the average across the US, NG and coal 
together were a larger contributor to industry than was oil. 
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In the north east manufacturing states of Illinois (IL), Indiana (IN), Michigan (MI), New 
York (NY), Ohio (OH) and Pennsylvania (PA), the area now sometimes referred to as the 
Rust Belt, coal was by far the most important source of energy for industrial output.  
There is little evidence of research focused on the consequences for industry, and particularly 
energy-intensive manufacturing, of the surge in coal prices prior to the large loss of 
manufacturing jobs between 1979 and 1982. For this reason, this analysis seeks to focus on 
the impact of all fuel sources along with spare capacity in energy, on manufacturing 
employment. 
4 Results 
4.1 Results of the empirical analysis 
The explanatory variables included in the model for manufacturing employment are 
percentage of energy consumed by industry from: thermal coal (pCLO); metallurgical coal 
(pCLK); NG (pNG); NU (pNU); petroleum (pPA); renewable fuels (pRE); and the gap 
between the value of energy produced and the value of energy consumed as a proportion of 
GDP (EGAP). Including the percentage of all fuel types in the regression analysis could 
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Figure 1: Fuel source for industrial production 1973-82: Various regions 
Sources: (EIA, 2014a; EIA, 2014b) 
Note: Electricity consumed (ES) allocated to fuel source based on electricity generated from each fuel source 
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result in collinearity, and as this analysis seeks to establish the significance of non-oil fuel 
sources for industry in the US during this period, pPA is excluded as an explanatory variable.  
Table 1: Regression analysis of resilience metrics as predictors of manufacturing employment 1973-82 
 
Resilience 
metrics 
Statistically 
significant resilience 
metrics 
Statistically 
Significant 
resilience metrics 
excluding outliers 
Regression  A B C 
Dependent variable 
(Weighted average change in 
manufacturing employment 1973-
82)  
EMP_CHG 
Mean of dependent variable 0.037607 0.037607 0.029962 
Std Dev of dependent variable 0.092397 0.092397 0.086056 
Regression Least squares Least squares Least squares 
Observations 50 50 48 
    
Fit: R2 0.397891 0.365525 0.509058 
Fit: Adj R2 0.313876 0.324147 0.475585 
Fit: F-stat 4.735939 8.833643 15.20790 
    
Intercept 
(Prob) 
VIF 
-0.000769 
(0.9848) 
15.20 
-0.041393 
(0.1398) 
6.58 
-0.065703 
(0.0069) 
6.63 
    
Coefficients    
EGAP 
(Prob) 
VIF 
1.180120 
(0.0599) 
1.59 
0.191371 
(0.0414) 
1.55 
0.172083 
(0.0268) 
1.56 
pCLO 
(Prob) 
VIF 
-0.075709 
(0.3756) 
3.43 
  
pCLK 
(Prob) 
VIF 
-0.146963 
(0.3502) 
1.62 
  
pNG 
(Prob) 
VIF 
0.173056 
(0.0498) 
5.52 
0.215772 
(0.0099) 
4.89 
0.251944 
(0.0004) 
4.88 
pNU 
(Prob) 
VIF 
-0.079174 
(0.6771) 
1.64 
  
pRE 
(Prob) 
VIF 
0.195676 
(0.0394) 
2.59 
0.255380 
(0.0030) 
2.05 
0.303602 
(0.0000) 
2.09 
    
Jarque_Bera stat 
(heteroskedasticity 
exists if >5.99) 
20.92191 14.78757 5.970001 
Condition index 
(multicollinearity 
 problem if >15) 
18.71 10.54 10.43 
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After exclusion of Nevada (NV) as an outlierv, the variables explain 31.4% of the variation in 
manufacturing employment as shown in Table 1, regression A. The results of the regression 
analysis and hypothesis tests on the coefficients for pCLO, pCLK, and pNU indicate a high 
probability that they are not statistically significant.  Thus, pCLO, pCLK, and pNU are 
excluded from the model in regression B with the explanatory variables accounting for 32.4% 
of the variation in manufacturing employment.  
However, the Jarque-Bera statistic indicates problems with heteroscedasticity. Further 
examination of the variables indicated that North Dakota (ND) and Utah (UT) are potential 
outliers in the model specificationvi. Excluding ND and UT from the model improves the fit 
to explain 47.6% of the variation in employment across 48 states as shown in regression C.  
Weighted average manufacturing employment across the US decreased by 1% over the 
period 1973-82. Regionally, the change in manufacturing employment varied from an 
increase of 24% in Alaska (AK) to a reduction of 12% in Maine (ME) (excluding the increase 
of NV of 37% as an outlier). The results from the regression analysis indicate that for every 
10% of energy value surplus as a proportion of GDP, manufacturing employment increased 
by 1.7%. Conversely, for every 10% of energy value gap, manufacturing employment 
decreased by 1.7%. Consumption of NG and RE also indicated an improvement in 
manufacturing employment outcomes. For every 10% of NG and RE consumed by industry, 
manufacturing employment increased by 2.5% and 3% respectively.  
4.2 Findings from the qualitative analysis 
Averaging employment over the period 1973-82 masks volatility over the period from 
multiple shocks and recoveries. In particular, the employment decline post 1979 was the 
result of an extended period of elevated energy prices which eroded global competitiveness 
for the US manufacturing sector in general and the motor vehicle and steel industries in 
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particular. The motor vehicle industry (MVI) and the iron and steel industry (ISI) were 
energy, labour and capital intensive, with high paid workforces, concentrated in the industrial 
states in the north east of the US. Whilst the MVI invested heavily to adapt to the oil crises, 
the ISI showed less adaptive capacity to the increases in coal, NG and electricity prices. The 
loss of competitiveness of the ISI over the 1970s marked a turning point in the ability of US 
energy intensive manufacturing to compete globally.  
4.2.1 Relative size of energy intensive industries 
The manufacturing sector was a heavy energy user and the largest employer in the US 
employing 21% of workers in 1973.  By 1979 manufacturing employment as a percentage of 
the US total employment had slipped to 19% and by 1982 it was down to 17% (compared 
with only 7% in 2012). 
Table 2: US employment by sector 1973-82, in millions 
 1973 1979 1982 1979-1982 
 
million % total million % total million % total million 
% change 
1979/82 
All employment 98.4  113.1  114.2  1.0 0.9% 
Agriculture 4.5 5 
 
4.7 4 
 
4.6 4 
 
(0.07) -1.4% 
Construction 5.1 5 
 
5.9 5 
 
5.3 5 
 
(0.54) -9.1% 
Financial 
services 7.1 7 
 
8.6 8 
 
8.9 8 
 
0.32 3.7% 
Government 16.7 17 
 
18.4 16 
 
18.6 16 
 
0.15 0.8% 
         
Manufacturing 20.4 21 21.5 19 19.2 17 (2.23) -10.4% 
 - ISI 0.828 1 0.789 1 0.523 0 (0.266) -33.7% 
 - MVI 0.969 1 1.001 1 0.707 1 (0.294) -29.4% 
Mining 0.8 1 
 
1.2 1 
 
1.5 1 
 
0.35 30.2% 
Retail Trade 15.0 15 
 
17.6 16 
 
18.0 16 
 
0.36 2.0% 
Services 19.2 19 
 
24.0 21 
 
26.6 23 
 
2.6 10.9% 
Transport & 
Utilities 5.1 5 
 
5.6 5 
 
5.7 5 
 
0.02 0.3% 
Wholesale trade 4.5 5 
 
5.6 5 
 
5.7 5 
 
0.04 0.8% 
Source: (US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2015a) 
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Between 1979 and 1982, half a million MVI and ISI workers lost employment in the US, 
70% of which were employed in the north east industrial states of the area now sometimes 
referred to as the Rust Belt.  
Table 3: US average compensation and income from employment by sector: 1979 and 1982 
 1979  1982   
 
Average 
compensation 
($2012/person) 
Income from 
employment 
($2012 billions) 
 Average 
compensation 
($2012/person) 
Income from 
employment 
($2012 billions) 
 Income loss 
1979/82 
($2012 billions) 
All employment 
                 
41,639  
                    
4,711  
                 
39,739  
                    
4,537  
                     
(175) 
Agriculture 
                    
9,182  
                         
43  
                    
8,444  
                         
39  
                         
(4) 
Construction 
                 
47,055  
                       
277  
                 
42,000  
                       
224  
                       
(52) 
Financial 
services 
                 
30,515  
                       
263  
                 
31,194  
                       
279  
                         
16  
Government 
                 
49,613  
                       
914  
                 
49,025  
                       
910  
                         
(4) 
Manufacturing 
                 
60,053  
                    
1,290  
                 
58,970  
                    
1,135  
                     
(155) 
 - ISI 
                
86,592  
                         
68  
                 
83,263  
                         
44  
                       
(25) 
 - MVI 
                 
88,719  
                         
89  
                 
87,836  
                         
62  
                       
(27) 
Mining 
                 
65,620  
                         
76  
                 
60,268  
                         
91  
                         
15  
Retail Trade 
                 
25,750  
                       
454  
                 
23,233  
                       
418  
                       
(36) 
Services 
                 
29,563  
                       
710  
                 
29,109  
                       
775  
                         
65  
Transport & 
Utilities 
                 
65,691  
                       
370  
                 
63,370  
                       
358  
                       
(12) 
Wholesale trade 
                 
55,835  
                       
315  
                 
54,034  
                       
307  
                         
(8) 
Source: (US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2015a; US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2015b) 
The impact on consumer purchases of manufactured goods from the loss of 384,000 jobs in 
the Rust Belt was severe leading to a decline in manufacturing employment of 1.5 million for 
all manufacturing in the Rust Belt and 2.2 million across the US.     
New jobs were created in mining and services, but the mining jobs were created in states 
already enjoying the benefits of increased income from energy market activity while the 
services jobs were associated with a 50% reduction in compensation packages. A structural 
shift of this nature is not of itself a problem, but the sudden erosion of income was.  
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4.2.2 Energy intensive industries reliant on coal 
Industry in the large manufacturing states of MI, IN, OH and PA were dependent on NG and 
electricity generated from coal, not oil, for production.  Due to a lack of spare capacity in the 
coal and the coal transport systems, coal prices for industrial users increased 84% 1974 over 
1973, only returning to pre-1972 levels in 1991 well after the price of oil had bottomed out in 
1986. 
Figure 2 shows the price of electricity to industry in the Rust Belt states, where IN, MI, OH 
and PA were dependent on coal for electricity generation. IL and NY were reliant on oil for 
electricity generation, and for comparison, Texas (TX) and Washington (WA) were 
dependent on electricity generated from NG and hydro. So electricity costs for the 
manufacturing states escalated sharply with oil prices but were much slower to decline in 
price than was oil after 1982.  
 
 
Figure 2: Price of electricity to industry in various states: 1972-90 
Source: (EIA, 2014b) 
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Figure 3 shows the proportion of fuels consumed by industryvii in the Rust Belt over the 
period 1973-82. As is shown in Figure 3, MI, the automobile manufacturing state, relied on 
coal for 45% of its industrial production energy needs, whilst the iron and steel producing 
states of IN, OH and PA relied on coal for 60%, 60% and 55% of their industrial energy 
needs.  Across the Rust Belt, coal underpinned 46% of energy consumed by industry.  
4.2.3 Energy cost increases and international competitiveness 
With its reliance on electricity from cheap thermal coal and metallurgical coal for coke, the 
ISI was particularly vulnerable to the large price increases for thermal and metallurgical coal 
that were meted out after 1973.   
Whilst metallurgical coal is a feedstock for the creation of coke, its price is determined by 
market forces in the thermal coal system. As shown in Figure 4, the price of metallurgical 
coal escalates exponentially when thermal coal prices rise.  
Figure 3: Fuel source for industrial production 1973-82: Rust Belt states 
Sources: (EIA, 2014b; EIA, 2014a) 
Note: Electricity consumed (ES) allocated to fuel source based on electricity generated from each fuel source 
36%
20% 19%
47%
19% 22%
27%
27%
18% 28%
13%
19% 16%
20%
28%
60% 45% 21% 60% 55% 46%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
IL IN MI NY OH PA RB
 % (PA+ES)  % (NG+ES)  % (CL+ES)
17 
 
 
Figure 4: Thermal coal versus metallurgical coal prices 1970-2012 
Source: (EIA, 2014b) 
Traditionally, it has been assumed that resilience requires a diversity of options be available 
to enable adaptation. However, the benefits of diversity are reduced if there is a lack of spare 
capacity and potential for substitution. The lack of spare capacity in all fossil fuel systems 
caused all prices to rise and the integrated, capital-intensive nature of the ISI in the 1970s 
precluded the industry from contemplating diversification to alternate fuel sources. This 
meant that the industry was forced to absorb or pass on the costs inflicted on it by a lack of 
resilience in its core energy source. 
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Figure 5: Energy cost for the Iron and Steel industry 1970-1990 
Source: (Becker et al., 2009; EIA, 2014b; US Geological Survey, 2014) 
Initially, price controls in the US, implemented to contain inflation, held back energy price 
increases, but in April 1974 price controls were lifted. Because of the large increase in coal 
and iron ore prices (freight rates as a result of oil price increases were cited as underpinning 
iron ore price rises (Klinger, 1973; Klinger, 1974)), the industry increased prices by 30% 
over the remainder of the year (Reno, 1974). This improved profitability but made the US 
market attractive to international competitors. 
As evidenced in Figure 5, energy costs rose from 8.7% of revenue in 1973 to 14% of revenue 
in 1980, causing the US ISI to stumble, with its contribution to GDP falling $22 billion 
alongside a $44 billion decline in contribution to GDP for the MVI. By 1981 the MVI 
managed to stem the decline through massive investment which facilitated adaptation to high 
energy costs with the production of more fuel efficient vehicles. By comparison, the ISI had 
few adaptation options available to respond to its rising energy costs. Between 1979 and 
1982, the value of product shipments declined 48% and employment fell by 34%. However 
1982 was not the end of the employment woes for the workers in the industry, as 19% more 
jobs were shed by 1986. 
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5 Discussion 
Some of the key findings to emerge from the analysis in Section 4 are discussed below. 
5.1 States with energy deficits and reliance on oil and coal experience higher 
manufacturing employment decline 
The empirical analysis provides evidence of the impact of energy deficits on manufacturing 
employment. It also shows that consuming either NG or RE (mainly hydro) instead of oil or 
coal provided a buffer against the consequences of the oil price shock. As spare capacity and 
diversity are core characteristics of resilience, the evidence from the quantitative analysis 
shows that energy resilience plays an important role in manufacturing employment. The 
transmission of the oil price shock to the coal system meant that industry in states that were 
reliant on coal for energy suffered worse employment outcomes than states with high levels 
of NG or RE. 
5.2 Competition from Japan  
Japan’s economy was propelled by exports and imported energy. Domestic energy was in 
short-supply, so Japanese cars were engineered to be fuel efficient. Consequently, in an oil 
constrained world, international demand for Japanese motor vehicles increased by 26% in 
1973-75 and by 23% 1979-82, although there was an annual decline of 7% in 1982. Exports 
to the US increased 10% in 1979, 16% in 1980 as less fuel-efficient domestic vehicle sales 
declined. Exports to the USA declined only after 1986 (JAMA, 2015) when the oil price had 
fallen reducing the attractiveness of fuel efficiency, epitomised by the rise of the Sports 
Utility Vehicle (Davis and Truett, 2000). 
Due to its lack of raw materials, Japan protected its interests with 12-15 year terms on 
contracts for raw materials. With a focus on diversity of supply, investment in raw material 
extraction and transportation, and efficiency in the use of raw materials in production 
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(Bunker and Ciccantell, 2007; Queensland Coal Board, 1973-1983), Japan secured lower 
energy costs than the US.   
Figure 6 shows the energy cost for steel production in the US and Japan. From reports it 
appears that most US investment was directed to meet the automobile industry’s projections 
of significant growth (Duke et al., 1977) rather than address cost factors to improve 
international competitiveness.  
 
Figure 6: Energy cost for steel production, US versus Japan 1960-76 
Source: (Duke et al., 1977) 
Discussion on the progress of technology after 1975 in the Department of Mines’ Iron and 
Steel Yearbooks emphasized weight reduction required by the automotive industry (Desy, 
1977; Desy, 1978-79). It would seem that the ISI was unprepared for the consequences of the 
oil price rise in terms of thermal and metallurgical coal price increases. Little research had 
been conducted on reducing energy and metallurgical coal requirements because of the ready 
availability of US coal. Direct Reduction, the process of by-passing the coke oven/blast 
furnace smelting in the production of iron, needed very large quantities of cheap fuel 
(generally NG), of which there was little available in the north-east industrial regions of the 
US at the time. There appeared to be no viable alternatives for steel producers to consider.  
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The conclusion that is drawn from the comparison of the US MVI and ISI with their Japanese 
counterparts is that Japan, despite its lack of natural resources, showed evidence of higher 
levels of energy resilience. A lack of domestic production of oil had led to the production of 
motor vehicles better adapted to an oil-constrained world than US motor vehicles. Whilst 
Japanese producers still used metallurgical coal for the production of iron, Japan’s strategy to 
source metallurgical coal from multiple countries, by directly investing in mines, and 
developing technology to tolerate varying qualities of metallurgical coal, provided iron 
producers with the spare capacity and diversity to adapt to rapidly increasing coal prices. As a 
result of this resilience in energy, their manufacturing industries were better able to adapt and 
compete internationally as energy prices escalated, as evidenced by the increase in exports of 
motor vehicles and steel during and after the oil crises of the 1970s. 
5.3 Decline in US manufacturing states hegemony 
With high costs of energy, US labour efficiencies became the prime focus to accomplish cost 
reductions to compete with international competitors. The decline in manufacturing in the 
Rust Belt led to a structural change to economic enterprise which was more focussed on the 
provision of services at home than dominance in global manufacturing. This reduced US 
energy-intensity, cushioning the economy from future energy shocks, but the long term 
consequences for the Rust Belt was population stagnation and sclerotic economic 
performance decades into the future, as seen in Figure 7. The size of the Rust Belt economy 
only returned to its 1978 size in 1985, and in every decade since 1985, the Rust Belt has had 
significantly lower average annual growth than the rest of the country.  The shift to a service-
22 
 
led economy produced small benefits for the economies of the states in the Rust Belt. 
 
Figure 7: Cumulative GDP growth from 1972: Various US regions and Japan 
Sources: (EIA, 2014b; World Bank, 2016) 
6 Conclusions 
The very high oil prices in evidence between 1974 and 1982 were coupled with significant 
declines in the economic fortunes of some countries and industries. The empirical analysis 
and case study reported in this paper seek not to support or discount any of the existing body 
of research that has sought to identify causes of the economic woes of the 1970s and 1980s, 
but rather to present another view of the causes and consequences of related energy price 
rises.   
US manufacturing, in particular manufacturing in the heavily industrialised states of the 
north-east, was reliant on metallurgical coal for steel production and electricity generated 
from coal. A lack of spare capacity in the coal system and the coal transport systems, led to 
sharp increases in the cost of coal, a commodity which was always expected to be cheap 
because of its abundance. The increase in coal prices led to escalating electricity prices for 
industry and soaring metallurgical coal prices for the production of iron.  ISI energy cost 
increases were passed on to customers, making the US steel market attractive to international 
-50.0%
0.0%
50.0%
100.0%
150.0%
200.0%
250.0%
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
7
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
1
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e 
g
ro
w
th
 (
re
al
)
fr
o
m
 1
9
7
2
Rust belt (IL, IN, MI, NY, OH,
PA)
Energy giants (AK, LA, NM,
OK, TX, WY)
Sun states (CA & FL)
Rest of states
US Total
Japan
23 
 
producers experiencing decline in domestic demand in the wake of high oil prices. It is 
illuminating that Japan, a country with few domestic natural resources, had lower energy, 
metallurgical coal and iron ore costs during the 1970s and 1980s, than the US with its 
substantial deposits of all of these resources.   
This study finds that the reason for high energy costs in the US was a lack of spare capacity 
in energy. The lack of spare capacity in oil meant that embargoes and political instability led 
inexorably to increased prices. These increased prices spread to the NG and coal fuel systems 
due to a lack of spare capacity within these fuel systems to respond to demand for substitutes 
to oil. The ensuing increase in coal price had severe consequences for iron and steel 
manufacturing which was reliant on cheap fuel, electricity and raw materials to compete with 
international steel producers. The ISI was buffeted by the winds of both income and input 
cost shocks as the oil price decreased demand for motor vehicles and construction, and the 
coal price increased costs of production. As resilience is characterized by adequate levels of 
spare capacity and a diversity of options, the ISI suffered the consequences of being at the 
confluence of both direct and indirect effects of a lack of resilience in energy. 
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i SEDS provides estimations of primary energy consumed by industry by fuel type, but does 
not include the fuel consumed in the generation of electricity. The fuel source for industry 
consumption of electricity is estimated here by establishing the proportion of each fuel type 
in total electricity generation and applying that proportion to electricity consumed by industry 
and industry’s share of energy losses within the electricity system. 
ii Identifying spare capacity in the energy system is challenging. There are no reports 
available on oil productive capacity. As oil was imported for much of the US over both 
periods, it would be reasonable to assume that in both periods there was a lack of spare 
capacity in the oil fuel system across the US. There are estimations available from the EIA on 
productive capacity of NG, but only from 1980-2003, and for 2012. There is no data available 
from the EIA on the productive capacity of coal mines prior to 1979.  
iii SEDS provides an estimate of the value of energy consumed and an estimate of energy 
production but no estimate of the value of energy produced.  To estimate the value of energy 
produced requires a value for energy at the ‘mine-mouth’ which again is not reliably 
available. In this exercise, the price of oil is assumed to be the price for West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI) as provided by EIA. This does not take into account the complicated 
price control structure for different oil producers in place for much of the period 1973-82. In 
theory the actual value of production could be calculated based on the EIA’s Crude Oil First 
Purchase Price but this series is not available by state for most of 1973-82. Using WTI as a 
value metric at least projects the increasing value of production in line with the increasing 
value for consumption.  For NG and coal, the price is assumed to be the price of energy 
supplied to the electric power industry. It is recognised that these estimations may produce 
value metrics which overstate the value of production and thus undervalue the spare capacity. 
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In effect, differences will most likely reflect profit and transportation costs, most of which are 
likely to be within state and therefore less relevant for a metric which seeks to understand the 
consequences of value of funds leaving the state. 
iv Alternative functional forms were considered for regression analysis. In particular, log-
linear models were considered and found to provide no improved relationship information. 
v Over the period 1973-82, Nevada experienced very high manufacturing employment 
growth, more than 3 standard deviations higher than the mean average growth over the period 
of 4.4%. However, over this period, Nevada’s manufacturing sector was very small, 
contributing only 4.1% to total employment, whereas tourism including legalised gambling, 
was the dominant sector employing more than 40% of all workers. As manufacturing 
employment was such a small part of the Nevada economy and its manufacturing 
employment growth was so much higher than the rest of the states, it is excluded as an outlier 
from this analysis. 
vi North Dakota and Utah, like Nevada, experienced good employment growth in 
manufacturing employment over the period 1973-82. This level of growth is not 
representative of states with a very small energy value surplus (like ND) or a small gap (like 
UT). As an example, Kentucky had a small energy value surplus, similar to North Dakota’s 
but experienced a contraction in manufacturing employment of 2.8% over the period. Kansas 
had a small energy value gap similar to Utah’s but experienced a 10% increase in 
manufacturing employment, less than half of Utah’s manufacturing employment growth. So, 
there are good reasons for excluding ND and UT from the model. 
vii For the purposes of accurately reflecting fuel consumption, industrial electricity 
consumption is included based on the proportion of electricity generated from each fuel 
source for the state. 
